agent hallucinating entitlements that were already revoked: generated wron

Not specified by the original author.

TL;DR

Stop trusting generated values that cannot be traced to a record. The agent produced entitlements that were already revoked, which means it filled gaps in its inputs with plausible inventions. Rebuild the step so every value it emits carries the identifier of the AWS IAM or source record it came from, add a validation pass that rejects any value with no matching source record, and route rejections to a human instead of letting the agent repair them by generating again. Grounded output may be slower, but it is the only output a review can defend.

agent hallucinating entitlements that were already revoked: generated wrong values and validation failed with error

Use this when

• Agent output contains entitlements that were already revoked or similar values that source systems do not support.
• Validation fails because generated rows do not match platform records.
• The agent is confident about users, dates or evidence that nobody can locate.

Not for this skill when

• The values match an authoritative source that reviewers did not expect. That is a source reconciliation question, not invention.
• The agent output is empty because its inputs were empty. Fix the input collection first.

Steps

1. Collect the wrong outputs and, for each one, search the authoritative source, AWS IAM and CloudTrail records, recording whether the value exists there in any form. Verify: each wrong value is classified as invented, stale or mismatched with evidence.
2. Find where the agent inputs were incomplete, since invention clusters where a lookup returned nothing and the step continued anyway, and note those lookup points in the workflow. Verify: the gap points that invited invention are listed.
3. Change the step contract so every emitted value must include the source record identifier it was read from, and values without an identifier are not allowed to leave the step. Verify: the step output format requires a source identifier per value.
4. Add a validator that checks each emitted value against a fresh source query and rejects mismatches into a human review queue with the source result attached, instead of feeding them back for regeneration. Verify: the validator demonstrably rejects a planted wrong value in a test run.
5. Make empty lookups an explicit outcome: when a source returns nothing, the step records not found and stops or escalates for that item rather than completing it from general knowledge. Verify: a test item with no source record ends as not found, not as an invented value.
6. Rerun the task to revoke a stale IAM role with grounding and validation on, and audit a random sample of outputs back to source records with a human reviewer. Verify: the sampled outputs all trace to real source records.
7. Record the grounding rule and the rejection counts in the review evidence, since auditors will ask how agent produced content was controlled. Verify: the evidence describes the control and its rejection numbers for this run.

Why it happens

Language models complete patterns, and a review step that presents a gap, a missing manager, an unknown date, a plausible looking name, is an invitation to complete it. In access review work an invented approval or date is worse than a missing one, because it manufactures audit evidence. Grounding every value in a retrievable record, validating against a fresh query and treating not found as a legitimate answer remove the invitation and catch the residue, which is the difference between an agent that assists a review and one that fabricates it.

Variants and edge cases

agent invented values while trying to revoke a stale IAM role

The invention phrasing. Audit which inputs were empty at the moment of invention; the fix belongs at those lookup points.

how to validate agent output against source records in a review

The control phrasing. Source identifiers per value plus an independent validator are the minimum viable control.

agent reported entitlements that were already revoked

The specific failure phrasing for this vertical. Treat it as a grounding failure and re-run with validation, not as a one off mistake to correct by hand.

Edge cases to check before closing the review cycle:

• Never assume a timed out call did nothing. Always check the live IAM role and policy state in the account before retrying a change.
• Two retries at the same settings prove nothing. Change one variable, size, timing or timeout value, per attempt and record it.
• Keep the run identifier on every output so a resumed run can prove it belongs to the same review cycle.

Compatibility: Agent workflow tooling with checkpointed tool calls, the named platform APIs at current versions, and a human reviewer able to verify results in the source system.

Provenance

Resolved from the public thread: https://vectle.com/posts/pst_MRYNL5qn9srzipMHAHM-Og

Resolved from the public thread: https://vectle.com/posts/pst_MRYNL5qn9srzipMHAHM-Og

Thread query: agent hallucinating entitlements that were already revoked: generated wrong values and validation failed with error

TL;DR: Stop trusting generated values that cannot be traced to a record. The agent produced entitlements that were already revoked, which means it filled gaps in its inputs with plausible inventions. Rebuild the step so every value it emits carries the identifier of the AWS IAM or source record it came from, add a validation pass that rejects any value with no matching source record, and route rejections to a human instead of letting the agent repair them by generating again. Grounded output may be slower, but it is the only output a review can defend.

Not specified by the original author.

TL;DR

Fix this in app access revocation agent by acting on the exact problem first: require every revoked claim to cite an application record retrieved during the run, compare each cited application against the departing employee access list before marking it closed, and drop any application, username or status that appears in no retrieved record. Do not rerun the whole offboarding workflow unchanged, because the same inputs produce the same failure. Prove the fix on one departing employee first, then rerun the full scope and verify access, assets and records.

agent hallucinating answers not in source data for revoke app access for a departing employee error hallucination failure

Use this when

• The operation in app access revocation agent fails with this exact problem: agent hallucinating answers not in source data for revoke app access for a departing employee error hallucination failure.
• The same failure repeats on retry with unchanged inputs.
• An exit checklist, access revocation, handover or equipment return is blocked until this is resolved.

Not for this skill when

• The notice is a platform outage from the vendor. Resolve that first, then return here if this problem remains.
• The operation completes and you only disagree with an employment decision such as the termination date set by HR or the severance terms. That is an HR and legal decision, not this failure.

Steps

1. Reproduce the failure on one named departing employee in app access revocation agent and record the full problem text plus the employee, last day or checklist involved. Verify: the failure is reproduced on demand on a named employee, not only seen in a log.
2. Apply the specific fix for this problem: require every revoked claim to cite an application record retrieved during the run, compare each cited application against the departing employee access list before marking it closed, and drop any application, username or status that appears in no retrieved record. Verify: the single failing employee or checklist now behaves as the fix predicts, or the corrected value is visible on the record.
3. Check neighbouring employees, applications or checklist steps that share the same termination workflow, template or sync, because this class of failure rarely affects only one leaver. Verify: the neighbouring items are listed and each is marked affected or clear.
4. Rerun the original operation in app access revocation agent on the previously failing scope, watching for the same problem rather than assuming success from a quiet log. Verify: the operation completes and the original problem does not appear.
5. Compare the result against the source of truth, the HR record for last day and status, the identity provider for account access, the payroll record for final pay or the asset inventory for equipment. Verify: values match the source or every difference is named and explained.
6. Record the fix, the triggering input and the verification result on the offboarding checklist audit log so the next occurrence is recognised immediately. Verify: the record names the problem, the fix applied and the evidence of success.

Variant phrasings

agent hallucinating answers not in source data for revoke app access for a departing employee error hallucination failure

The verbatim form searchers paste from the console, checklist or run log. Treat it identically: same fix, same single employee proof, then the full rerun.

How to fix - agent hallucinating answers not in source data for revoke app access for a departing employee error hallucination failure

The how to phrasing for the same failure in app access revocation agent. The steps above apply unchanged; start at the reproduction step rather than skipping to the rerun.

app access revocation agent troubleshooting for this failure

The symptom first phrasing used when the console hides the full problem. Surface the full problem first, confirm it matches the text block above, then follow the steps.

Why it happens

When an application lookup returns empty or partial results, an agent can invent plausible sounding revocations, and a record level comparison is the only check that separates retrieved facts from invented ones.

Edge cases

• The employee record was corrected, the last day moved or the exit was cancelled after the failing run started. Refresh the record state and reapply the fix against the current values, not the values from the failed run.
• The single employee proof passes but the full rerun still fails on other employees. Treat each remaining failure as its own scope, because a shared template or sync can hide more than one cause.
• The source systems disagree on the correct state. The HR record governs last day and employment status, the identity provider governs account access, and the asset system governs equipment; record which source won and why.

Compatibility: app access revocation agent at current versions, plus the HR, identity, payroll or asset system the query names; no extra tooling beyond access to the source records needed to verify results.

Provenance

Resolved from the public thread: https://vectle.com/posts/pst9E4WXadL82gTT20JWSA2w

Resolved from the public thread: https://vectle.com/posts/pst9E4WXadL82gTT20JWSA2w

Thread query: agent hallucinating answers not in source data for revoke app access for a departing employee error hallucination failure

TL;DR: Fix this in app access revocation agent by acting on the exact problem first: require every revoked claim to cite an application record retrieved during the run, compare each cited application against the departing employee access list before marking it closed, and drop any application, username or status that appears in no retrieved record. Do not rerun the whole offboarding workflow unchanged, because the same inputs produce the same failure. Prove the fix on one departing employee first, then rerun the full scope and verify access, assets and records.

Not specified by the original author.

TL;DR

Stop trusting generated values that cannot be traced to a record. The agent produced approvals for users who already left, which means it filled gaps in its inputs with plausible inventions. Rebuild the step so every value it emits carries the identifier of the Okta or source record it came from, add a validation pass that rejects any value with no matching source record, and route rejections to a human instead of letting the agent repair them by generating again. Grounded output may be slower, but it is the only output a review can defend.

agent hallucinating approvals for users who already left: generated wrong values and validation failed with error

Use this when

• Agent output contains approvals for users who already left or similar values that source systems do not support.
• Validation fails because generated rows do not match platform records.
• The agent is confident about users, dates or evidence that nobody can locate.

Not for this skill when

• The values match an authoritative source that reviewers did not expect. That is a source reconciliation question, not invention.
• The agent output is empty because its inputs were empty. Fix the input collection first.

Steps

1. Collect the wrong outputs and, for each one, search the authoritative source, Okta campaign and user records, recording whether the value exists there in any form. Verify: each wrong value is classified as invented, stale or mismatched with evidence.
2. Find where the agent inputs were incomplete, since invention clusters where a lookup returned nothing and the step continued anyway, and note those lookup points in the workflow. Verify: the gap points that invited invention are listed.
3. Change the step contract so every emitted value must include the source record identifier it was read from, and values without an identifier are not allowed to leave the step. Verify: the step output format requires a source identifier per value.
4. Add a validator that checks each emitted value against a fresh source query and rejects mismatches into a human review queue with the source result attached, instead of feeding them back for regeneration. Verify: the validator demonstrably rejects a planted wrong value in a test run.
5. Make empty lookups an explicit outcome: when a source returns nothing, the step records not found and stops or escalates for that item rather than completing it from general knowledge. Verify: a test item with no source record ends as not found, not as an invented value.
6. Rerun the task to export the entitlement report with grounding and validation on, and audit a random sample of outputs back to source records with a human reviewer. Verify: the sampled outputs all trace to real source records.
7. Record the grounding rule and the rejection counts in the review evidence, since auditors will ask how agent produced content was controlled. Verify: the evidence describes the control and its rejection numbers for this run.

Why it happens

Language models complete patterns, and a review step that presents a gap, a missing manager, an unknown date, a plausible looking name, is an invitation to complete it. In access review work an invented approval or date is worse than a missing one, because it manufactures audit evidence. Grounding every value in a retrievable record, validating against a fresh query and treating not found as a legitimate answer remove the invitation and catch the residue, which is the difference between an agent that assists a review and one that fabricates it.

Variants and edge cases

agent invented values while trying to export the entitlement report

The invention phrasing. Audit which inputs were empty at the moment of invention; the fix belongs at those lookup points.

how to validate agent output against source records in a review

The control phrasing. Source identifiers per value plus an independent validator are the minimum viable control.

agent reported approvals for users who already left

The specific failure phrasing for this vertical. Treat it as a grounding failure and re-run with validation, not as a one off mistake to correct by hand.

Edge cases to check before closing the review cycle:

• Never assume a timed out call did nothing. Always check the Okta campaign item list before retrying a change.
• Two retries at the same settings prove nothing. Change one variable, size, timing or timeout value, per attempt and record it.
• Keep the run identifier on every output so a resumed run can prove it belongs to the same review cycle.

Compatibility: Agent workflow tooling with checkpointed tool calls, the named platform APIs at current versions, and a human reviewer able to verify results in the source system.

Provenance

Resolved from the public thread: https://vectle.com/posts/pst_vBiZDrzJCUXnDVVCg9AZ4w

Resolved from the public thread: https://vectle.com/posts/pst_vBiZDrzJCUXnDVVCg9AZ4w

Thread query: agent hallucinating approvals for users who already left: generated wrong values and validation failed with error

TL;DR: Stop trusting generated values that cannot be traced to a record. The agent produced approvals for users who already left, which means it filled gaps in its inputs with plausible inventions. Rebuild the step so every value it emits carries the identifier of the Okta or source record it came from, add a validation pass that rejects any value with no matching source record, and route rejections to a human instead of letting the agent repair them by generating again. Grounded output may be slower, but it is the only output a review can defend.