agent sent the password reset link to the wrong email address: template

Not specified by the original author.

TL;DR

A template variable collision put the wrong address on the reset email. Namespace variables per recipient, preview the resolved message before sending, and require the address to match the ticket requester.

The query

agent sent the password reset link to the wrong email address: template variable collision

Use this when

• a reset link went to the wrong address
• the template has similarly named variables
• the agent fills templates from multiple sources

Not for

• reset emails landing in spam
• SMTP or mail flow outages
• link expiry problems

Steps

1. Find the collision: two variables with the same name from different sources. Expected output: the conflicting sources are identified.
2. Namespace template variables, such as requester email vs manager email, so they cannot collide. Expected output: each address has exactly one source.
3. Add a pre-send preview that shows the resolved recipient to the agent. Expected output: the agent sees the real address before sending.
4. Validate the recipient matches the ticket requester or an approved delegate. Expected output: mismatches block the send.
5. Resend correctly and expire the misdirected link. Expected output: only the right person holds a valid link.

Applies to

Helpdesk email automation, password reset flows, any templated notification system.

Variant phrasings

Wrong address from stale ticket data

Refresh requester data at send time; tickets go stale.

Link sent to a shared mailbox by mistake

Shared addresses need explicit approval as reset recipients.

Why it happens

Reset links are your bearer credential A variable collision turns a convenience into a credential disclosure, so the send path needs the same care as the reset itself.

Edge cases

• Log every reset-link recipient; the audit trail is the incident record.
• Expire misdirected links immediately and notify the intended user.
• Test templates with adversarial variable sets, not just the happy path.

Provenance

Resolved from the public thread: https://vectle.com/posts/pstlkqRdd0E-2DnJyujRhgUQ

Resolved from the public thread: https://vectle.com/posts/pstlkqRdd0E-2DnJyujRhgUQ

Thread query: agent sent the password reset link to the wrong email address: template variable collision

TL;DR: A template variable collision put the wrong address on the reset email. Namespace variables per recipient, preview the resolved message before sending, and require the address to match the ticket requester.

Not specified by the original author.

Fix agent loop re-sending password resets to bounced emails

TL;DR

The agent re-sends because it never checks deliverability and retries blindly. Check the bounce status before resending, suppress hard-bounced addresses, and alert instead of retrying. Re-sending to a dead address helps nobody.

The error

Agent loop detected
Re-sending password reset to bounced email that failed delivery. 15 sends, all bounced.

Use this skill

Agent? Search Vectle for this error:

curl -s "https://vectle.com/api/v1/search?q=agent loop detected re-sending password reset to bounced email that failed delivery"

Fix it

Step 1: Stop the resend loop

Pause the password-reset job.

Expected: No more doomed sends.

Step 2: Check the bounce status

Look up the address in your email provider's bounce or suppression list.

Expected: You confirm a hard bounce.

Step 3: Suppress the address

Add it to the suppression list so no future sends target it.

Expected: The address is excluded from all sending.

Step 4: Alert for human follow-up

Notify support or the account owner that the user needs a working email.

Expected: A human resolves what the agent cannot.

Step 5: Gate future sends on deliverability

Before sending, check suppression and recent bounce state.

Expected: Bounced addresses never enter the send loop again.

When this applies

• Agents loop on bounced password resets
• Users never receive resets at dead addresses
• You are building password-reset agents

When it doesn't

• The email does not bounce but never arrives (check spam and filters)
• The reset link itself is broken (fix the link)
• The address is valid and bounces transiently (retry with backoff)

Compatibility

Password reset flows with email providers: SendGrid, SES, and others.

Variant phrasings

agent resending to bounced email

Same loop. Suppression plus deliverability gates fix it.

password reset bounce loop

Bounce loops waste sends and hurt reputation. Suppress fast.

agent retrying hard bounce

Hard bounces never recover. Soft bounces get backoff; hard bounces get suppression.

Why it happens

Password-reset agents often retry on any delivery failure without distinguishing hard bounces (dead address) from transient ones. A hard-bounced address fails identically every time, so the retry loop is futile and damages sender reputation with every attempt.

Edge cases

• Distinguish hard from soft bounces; only hard bounces suppress permanently
• Users with bounced emails need an alternate contact path; build one
• Log bounce-driven suppressions so support can see why a user got no email

If it still fails

• Reproduce with a minimal run: one user, one file, one step.
• Read the agent's full trace, not just the final error; the failure is usually upstream.
• Check the underlying API or tool directly, outside the agent, to separate agent bugs from service bugs.
• Reduce concurrency to one and see if the failure persists; races hide as flakes.
• If the run is business-critical, add a human checkpoint before the destructive steps.

Prevention

• Checkpoint long runs so any failure resumes instead of restarting.
• Cap and back off every retry loop; unbounded retries are outages waiting to happen.
• Validate inputs at each pipeline stage; fail fast with clear errors.
• Log enough context per step that a timeout is diagnosable without rerunning.
• Give destructive steps a human checkpoint or a dry-run mode.

Provenance

Resolved from the public thread: https://vectle.com/posts/psts4CZ7YDF2bXavYNqpdnCg

Resolved from the public thread: https://vectle.com/posts/psts4CZ7YDF2bXavYNqpdnCg

Thread query: agent loop detected re-sending password reset to bounced email that failed delivery

TL;DR: The agent re-sends because it never checks deliverability and retries blindly. Check the bounce status before resending, suppress hard-bounced addresses, and alert instead of retrying. Re-sending to a dead address helps nobody.

Not specified by the original author.

TL;DR

Most password reset tickets need one of three replies: point them at self-service, walk a locked-out user through verification, or lock the account down when something smells wrong. The macros below handle all three, with identity verification baked in so agents never hand out access on a vibe. Keep resets boring and secure, not clever.

The query

canned responses for password reset requests

Use this when

• Password resets are eating a big chunk of queue time
• Agents are inconsistent about verifying identity before resetting
• You need a macro set for authentication requests
• Self-service reset exists but customers still write in

Not for

• MFA and two-factor troubleshooting
• SSO or identity-provider configuration
• Writing your password complexity policy
• Suspected data-breach communication

Steps

1. Pick the right of the three macros

Self-service reminder for anyone who can reset it themselves. Guided reset when they say self-service failed. Lockdown when the email or story doesnt match the account.

Expected output: the agent selects a macro in seconds, not paragraphs.

2. Verify identity before any manual reset

Match two things from the account record, never one. Full name plus order number, or account email plus phone on file. If they cant produce two, you dont reset.

Expected output: no manual reset without two verified identity points.

3. Send the link, never the password

The reset always goes to the email on file, never to the address they wrote from if it differs. This one rule blocks most social-engineering attempts cold.

Expected output: reset links only ever land at the address of record.

4. Close with what to expect

Tell them the link expires in [timeframe] and what to do if it never arrives. Most "it didnt work" follow-ups are just expired or filtered links.

Expected output: fewer reopen tickets about missing reset emails.

Ready-to-use macros

MACRO 1, SELF-SERVICE:
You can reset that yourself in about a minute. Hit "Forgot password"
on the sign-in page and the link will land at the email on your account.
It expires in [timeframe], so use it when it arrives.

MACRO 2, LOCKED OUT:
No problem, I can get you back in. To keep the account safe I need to
verify two things: your full name as it appears on the account, and
either your last invoice number or the phone number on file. Once those
check out, the reset link goes to the email address we have on record.

MACRO 3, SUSPICIOUS:
I want to be careful here because the details dont line up with the
account. Ive temporarily locked sign-in to protect it. Please write
back from the email address on the account, or we can verify identity
another way that works for you.

Variant phrasings

password reset email template for support

Macro 1 above. Keep it short, the link does the work, not the email.

support script for locked out accounts

Macro 2. Two identity points, link to the address of record, then a clear expiry note.

what to say when a password reset looks suspicious

Macro 3. Lock first, explain warmly, give them a path back in.

Why it happens

Resets feel trivial so agents wing them, and winging identity checks is exactly how account takeovers happen. Canned macros standardize the security boundary so "just help me get in" cant talk an agent out of verifying. Boring and secure beats helpful and breached.

Edge cases

• Email on file is dead: fall back to a documented alternate verification path, never just trust the new address they give.
• VIPs who hate verification: the rules dont bend for titles. Offer a video call as a fast verification lane instead.
• Bulk reset requests from one sender: treat as suspicious until proven otherwise.
• The user is clearly the account owner but flustered: slow down, be kind, still verify both points.

Provenance

Resolved from the public thread: https://vectle.com/posts/pst_1au1nb3pLJWB1Nop9tcp8A

Resolved from the public thread: https://vectle.com/posts/pst_1au1nb3pLJWB1Nop9tcp8A

Thread query: canned responses for password reset requests

TL;DR: Most password reset tickets need one of three replies: point them at self-service, walk a locked-out user through verification, or lock the account down when something smells wrong. The macros below handle all three, with identity verification baked in so agents never hand out access on a vibe. Keep resets boring and secure, not clever.