Design question. A CLI installer inserts a fixed set of exact tool allow rules into a developer settings file that the user also edits by hand and that may already contain allow rules and explicit deny rules. Repair must restore missing installer rules without clobbering user entries, and uninstall must remove only rules the installer introduced, leaving pre-existing identical allows and every deny untouched. The complication is crash ordering: setup persists an ownership journal and then rewrites settings, and the process can die between those two steps, so the journal may claim ownership of rules that were never written, or settings may contain rules the journal never recorded. Known evidence: rules are exact string matches so set membership is well defined; denies should never be added or removed by the installer. Unknowns: whether the journal should record intent or outcome, how to reconcile a journal that disagrees with the settings file, and whether a content hash or generation counter is needed to detect user edits between runs.

Resolution by reasoning only; no tests were executed. Independent analysis reached the same design the two existing skills describe: ownership is decided by observation at install time and recorded per rule, pre-existing identical allows are recorded as unowned and never removed, the deny list is read for classification only and never written, every settings mutation is an idempotent exact string diff, and the write order is journal intent, then atomic settings replace, then journal commit. Crash after the intent write is harmless because replay is add if absent. Crash after the settings write is resolved on the next run by a witness recorded in the intent.

One caveat worth adding to the hash-only fallback described in the existing guidance. A planned post-write content hash is not unforgeable. If the host application serializes settings canonically, a user adding the same rule through the host UI during the crash window can produce byte-identical output, so a planned hash match would wrongly claim ownership of a user-authored rule and a later uninstall would remove it. The random token written into an installer namespaced key in the same atomic replacement remains the only witness a user cannot produce by accident. Where a token key is impossible, the safe default on a planned hash match should still be to report and ask rather than silently claim ownership, or to accept the small leak risk of declining ownership, since the settings-first ordering has no recovery at all and a leaked allow is the graver outcome for permission rules.

Decision: no new skill. Both existing skills already contain the ownership classification, intent then commit journal, witness, released marker for deliberate user deletions, compare before remove uninstall, and journal deletion last. The caveat above is a refinement to one fallback path, not a separate reusable solution.

Follow-up finding, reasoning only, no tests executed. Scenario extended: after install the developer edits one owned rule into a different string, deletes another, duplicates a third, and changes unrelated keys before uninstall.

Two refinements beyond the existing compare before remove guidance.

First, a bounded warning cardinality rule for the conflict report. Emit at most one line per owned effect, keyed by effect identity and conflict class, plus one summary line, and deduplicate against the report stored in the uninstalling intent. For six rules, one witness key and up to two containers this caps the report at ten lines regardless of how many times uninstall or recovery reruns. A rule the developer released earlier is reported once under the released class, never as a fresh conflict on each run. Without a cap, an idempotent recovery loop that reprints the report produces unbounded noise and hides the one line that matters.

Second, keep any optional background reporting worker off the critical path with a fixed deadline. The uninstall finalizes and deletes the journal on its own evidence only. The sharing gate for the report starts in a denied state and flips only on an explicit positive result from the worker; a worker crash, a missed deadline or an unreadable result leaves it denied. This is fail open for the primary task and fail closed for sharing, and the two must never be coupled, otherwise a hung reporter can either block uninstall or be misread as consent.

Also noted: byte identical comparison of a rule proves nothing about a rule the developer edited from it, so an edited owned rule is reported as absent, and any similarity hint must be informational and never drive removal. Format preserving serialization matters here: a parser that reserializes from the live document keeps content but may not keep the developer's whitespace, which is acceptable only if documented.

No new skill: the existing crash safe ownership journal skill already covers compare before remove and idempotent recovery from the stored plan; these are bounded refinements to reporting and to the reporting worker boundary.