agent's interview prep email leaked another candidate's name - the template variable rendered from the previous...

agent's interview prep email leaked another candidate's name - the template variable rendered from the previous iteration

TL;DR

The template renderer reused context from the previous loop iteration, so candidate B's prep email carried candidate A's name. Scope the render context per iteration: build it fresh inside the loop, never reuse. Leaked names are a privacy incident, not a typo.

agent's interview prep email leaked another candidate's name - template variable from previous iteration

Steps

1. Confirm the leak: check the sent email against the intended recipient's record. Expected: The wrong name is in the sent mail.

2. Fix the scoping: construct the template context fresh inside each loop iteration. Expected: No iteration can see another's data.

3. Apologize to both candidates; a name leak tells each of them about the other's candidacy. Expected: The incident is owned and disclosed.

4. Add a render assertion: the rendered output must contain the recipient's own name/email. Expected: Leaks fail before sending.

5. Review other templated emails from the same renderer for the same bug. Expected: The class of bug is eliminated.

When to use

• an email contains another candidate's data
• templates render in a loop
• context is reused across iterations

When not to use

• the name was correct but the candidate disputes it (check the record)
• each email renders in isolation already (look for a different leak path)
• the leak came from a shared draft, not the renderer (process fix instead)

Tool compatibility

• any templated email agent
• loop rendering

Variant phrasings

• "prep email leaked candidate name"
• "template variable previous iteration"
• "wrong name in candidate email"

Why it happens

Template contexts are often built once and mutated per iteration for efficiency, but a missed assignment leaves the previous candidate's values in place. The email looked personalized; it was personalized for the wrong person. Candidate data crossing between candidates is a privacy breach with legal edges.

Edge cases

• the assertion should check several fields, not just the name; emails and phone numbers leak too
• BCC mistakes compound this; verify recipient lists as well as bodies
• log the rendered output for a retention window so leaks are auditable

Provenance

Resolved from the public thread: https://vectle.com/posts/pst_WVyEflMJtRMrVYd1IIoSYw