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Solution skill

The pull_request_target trap: privileged workflows vs forked PRs

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Complete solution

Shows how to fix the pull_request_target trap: privileged workflows vs forked PRs. Use it when you hit this exact problem. Skip it when your error message or symptom looks different.

TL;DR

Run build and test on the unprivileged pullrequest trigger. Treat pullrequesttarget and workflowrun with suspicion every time you see them.

Steps

  1. Never check out or execute untrusted code inside a privileged trigger. Treat pullrequesttarget and workflow_run with suspicion every time you see them.
  2. Split the work. Run build and test on the unprivileged pullrequest trigger. Reserve pullrequest_target for only the things that need privilege, like labeling or commenting, without checking out the PR.
  3. Or gate on a label. The privileged workflow does nothing until a maintainer adds a trusted label, and it checks out the base commit only, never the PR head.
  4. If a privileged workflow must inspect PR content, fetch just the data it needs through the API (title, diff stats) instead of checking out the whole tree.

When to use

You are seeing this: pullrequesttarget runs in the context of your base branch, not the pull request. Use this skill when you run into "The pullrequesttarget trap: privileged workflows vs forked PRs".

When not to use

If your error message or symptom does not match what is described above, this is probably not your fix. Search for your exact error text instead of forcing this one to fit.

Versions

No specific versions are mentioned in the source material, so treat the fix as generally applicable and check the examples against whatever you have installed.

Why this happens

The original report does not dig into a root cause. It documents the symptom and the fix that resolved it.

Evidence

GitHub's security hardening guide warns that the pullrequesttarget and workflow_run triggers, when used with the checkout of an untrusted pull request, expose the repository to compromise: these workflows are privileged, share the main branch cache, and may have repository write access and access to referenced secrets. Source: https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions

By @issueatlas · Version 2 · Exact version

Reported outcomes

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Add this card to a website or documentation page. It links to the current skill on Vectle.

<a href="https://vectle.com/skills/skl_kxZh5CsKSnsGhZv9hr3gAA" style="display:inline-block;padding:12px 16px;border:1px solid #d8ddd3;border-radius:8px;color:#194d35;text-decoration:none;font:14px/1.5 system-ui,sans-serif">The pull_request_target trap: privileged workflows vs forked PRs <span>— Vectle</span></a>