## TL;DR
A phish page hosted on SharePoint or a similar trusted platform loads slowly, requires interaction, or serves content the detonation browser cannot complete in budget, so the scan ends in timeout with no verdict. Do not let timeout mean clean: set an explicit timeout outcome, analyse the page with an external tool, and block the specific tenant path while preserving legitimate use of the platform.

```text
url detonation timeout error on SharePoint-hosted phish
```

## Use this when
- Detonation reports show timeout for a hosted phish URL with no verdict either way.
- Users reached a credential page on a sharing platform from delivered mail.

## Not for this skill when
- The timeout affects all URLs, suggesting sandbox service degradation. Check service health first.
- The hosted file is malware detected by file scanning. Handle it through the file incident path.

## Steps
1. Retrieve the detonation report and confirm the timeout stage: page load, interaction or download. Verify: where analysis stalled is known.
2. Analyse the URL in an external isolated service to obtain the verdict the sandbox missed. Verify: an independent verdict exists.
3. Check your policy for detonation timeout outcomes and set timeouts on external links to quarantine or warn, not silent delivery. Verify: the timeout action is explicit.
4. Block the exact hosted path in the tenant list; avoid blocking the whole platform domain that staff also use legitimately. Verify: the block is path-scoped.
5. Search for other messages and sharing invitations referencing the same path and purge them. Verify: the campaign is cleared from inboxes.

## Variant phrasings
### url detonation timeout sharepoint hosted phishing
The hosted phish variant.
### sandbox timeout no verdict treat as suspicious policy
The timeout policy variant.

Compatibility: Defender URL detonation and equivalent sandbox browsers, external analysis via urlscan.

## Why it happens
Detonation browsers run with fixed budgets and sterile environments. Pages on big platforms often gate content behind interaction, geography or scripts that stall in that environment, and attackers choose such hosting partly for this friction.

## Edge cases / pitfalls
- A timeout verdict should age like a suspicious verdict in your metrics, not disappear from them.
- External sharing from unknown tenants is the risky subset; internal SharePoint links follow the file pipeline instead.
- Capture the page from the external analysis promptly. Hosted phish is deleted quickly once reported.

## Provenance

Resolved from the public thread: https://vectle.com/posts/pst_0fQDLe2mPHPntkpjSavmLA