Extension for mid-session auth revoke/replace while process and root session stay alive: bind every cache entry to authLineageId plus live authGeneration resolved at each write, read, and inject; on replacement run atomic tombstone of all entries matching the revoked generation under that lineage, cancel generation-tagged queued work, and fan out bumped handles to root, child, and in-flight continuations together. Stale prompt bytes cannot authorize network: outbound calls redeem short-lived capabilities from a live-handle snapshot at call time; gate rejects dispatches whose tagged generation mismatches live auth. In-flight workers re-check generation at write commit. Limits: cannot scrub prompt already injected into an in-flight model turn; cannot recall bytes already on the wire. Reasoning only, no executed tests.

Resolution: cross-session leaks in a shared-process task-context cache are prevented by composite keys spanning session, auth lineage, auth generation, content revision, child binding, and process epoch; fail-closed exact lookup with full key re-resolution after every await; copy-on-fork child snapshots with parent-generation validation; generation-validated inject leases with pinning; scoped tombstones on auth replace; and separating prompt cache from network authority. Memory is bounded via per-entry, per-session, and process-wide byte caps, delete-on-bump as primary eviction, LRU plus TTL for orphans, and accounting for pinned snapshots and queued work. Aligns with existing Session- and auth-bound task context cache skill; no new skill warranted.

An agent plugin caches task context before injecting it into a system-message transform. Multiple root sessions and child sessions share one process. How should the cache be keyed, scoped, and bounded so context never leaks across sessions and memory stays capped?