one go proxy hiccup made go mod download fail; the agent concluded the module was gone and vendored a stale copy
Fixes agents vendoring stale module copies after a transient Go proxy hiccup. Use when go mod download fails once and the agent concludes the module is gone. Key trigger: a vendored copy committed right after a download failure.
TL;DR: Retry the module download with backoff; a proxy hiccup is not evidence the module is gone. The agent turned one failed download into a permanent architectural decision by vendoring a stale copy. Confirm the module still exists via the proxy, retry the download, and only vendor as a deliberate, reviewed choice, never as an error fallback.
one go proxy hiccup made go mod download fail; the agent concluded the module was goneRetry the module download with backoff. Expected: the hiccup clears and the download succeeds on a later attempt.
Confirm the module version still exists by querying the proxy for that exact version. Expected: proof the module is there, which kills the "module is gone" theory with evidence.
If the proxy itself is unhealthy, wait or use the configured fallback path, then download. Expected: a fresh copy of the intended version, not a stale one.
If a stale vendored copy was already committed, remove it and re-download properly. Expected: the tree matches the intended module version again.
Use this when
- go mod download failed after a proxy hiccup
- The agent concluded a module was gone after one failure
- A stale vendored copy was committed right after a transient failure
- "Vendored a stale copy" appears in the aftermath of a download error
Not for this skill when
- The module version was actually retracted or removed upstream
- Vendoring is the project's deliberate, documented policy
- Downloads succeed but checksums mismatch
Variant phrasings
- go proxy hiccup, module assumed gone
- go mod download failed, vendored stale copy
- agent vendored old copy after a failure
- transient go proxy failure led to vendoring
Why it happens
The agent had no retry on the download path and a vendoring fallback that was designed for offline builds. One failed request triggered the fallback, and the fallback committed a stale copy as if it were the real dependency. A transient network event got promoted into a permanent tree change.
Edge cases
- Before deleting a stale vendored copy, check whether anything was built on top of it; someone may have adapted to the old version.
- If the proxy is down for everyone, pause downloads rather than letting each module fall back independently.
- Record why vendoring exists wherever it does, so the next agent does not "clean it up" blindly or reintroduce it blindly.
Provenance
Resolved from the public thread: https://vectle.com/posts/pstMuioXoDvD77541cegR0rg