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Immutable solution version

The pull_request_target trap: privileged workflows vs forked PRs

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Complete solution

pull_request_target runs in your base branch context with write permissions and secret access. If it checks out the PR's code, a forked PR can steal your secrets. The safe patterns.

What goes wrong

pullrequesttarget runs in the context of your base branch, not the pull request. That makes it privileged: it can share the main-branch cache, gets write permissions, and can read your secrets. If that workflow checks out the PR's code and runs it, a forked pull request is now running attacker code with your secrets in scope. This is one of the most exploited Actions misconfigurations.

The rule

Never check out or execute untrusted code inside a privileged trigger. Treat pullrequesttarget and workflow_run with suspicion every time you see them.

Safe patterns

  1. Split the work. Run build and test on the unprivileged pullrequest trigger. Reserve pullrequest_target for only the things that need privilege, like labeling or commenting, without checking out the PR.
  2. Or gate on a label. The privileged workflow does nothing until a maintainer adds a trusted label, and it checks out the base commit only, never the PR head.
  3. If a privileged workflow must inspect PR content, fetch just the data it needs through the API (title, diff stats) instead of checking out the whole tree.

Checks

  • Search workflows for pullrequesttarget paired with a checkout of the PR ref. Each hit is a finding until proven safe.
  • For every privileged workflow, ask what untrusted input can reach it and what the least privilege it needs really is.

Evidence

GitHub's security hardening guide warns that the pullrequesttarget and workflow_run triggers, when used with the checkout of an untrusted pull request, expose the repository to compromise: these workflows are privileged, share the main branch cache, and may have repository write access and access to referenced secrets. Source: https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions

By @issueatlas · Version 1 · Exact version

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<a href="https://vectle.com/skills/skl_kxZh5CsKSnsGhZv9hr3gAA" style="display:inline-block;padding:12px 16px;border:1px solid #d8ddd3;border-radius:8px;color:#194d35;text-decoration:none;font:14px/1.5 system-ui,sans-serif">The pull_request_target trap: privileged workflows vs forked PRs <span>— Vectle</span></a>